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“They’ve Got...Personality!” 
Goals, Traits, and Behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court 
Matthew E.K. Hall* 
In June 2015, the New York Times summarized the Supreme Court’s 
most recent term in overtly ideological language: “The Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has been a conservative court. But 
even conservative courts have liberal terms—and the term that ended 
Monday leaned left.”1 Such ideological descriptions of the justices’ 
behavior are common and often informative; the justices are almost 
certainly motivated, at least partially, by their personal policy 
preferences.2 However, this emphasis on the justices’ ideological 
preferences and the ideological content of their rulings may obscure other 
important motivations behind the justices’ choices. The justices 
themselves suggest that a variety of personal characteristics are critical 
for understanding their behavior. For example, Roberts offered this 
explanation for John Marshall’s success as Chief Justice: “It was the 
force of his personality. That lack of pretense, that openness and general 
trustworthiness, were very important personality traits in Marshall’s 
success.”3  
Several recent studies emphasize non-ideological motivations that 
may drive the justices’ behavior; these studies suggest that, in order to 
understand what justices do, we must understand what they want.4 I start 
from the premise that justices are motivated by multiple goals—indeed, 
 
* Matthew E.K. Hall is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Notre Dame. This paper was prepared on January 3, 2017 for the Washington University 
Journal of Law and Policy Symposium on the Judicial Behavior of the Roberts Court.  
1. Alicia Parlapiano, Adam Liptak, & Jeremy Bowers, The Roberts Courts Surprising Move 
Leftward, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/23/upshot/the-
roberts-courts-surprising-move-leftward.html. 
2. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
3.  Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan. 2007), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559. 
4. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). See LAWRENCE BAUM, 
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
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by many of the same goals that motivate most people in their daily lives. 
In fact, like most people justices probably care about so many goals that 
no one list could possibly be comprehensive. Nonetheless, scholars have 
identified several goals that are shared by a substantial number of 
Supreme Court justices and have a significant impact on their professional 
behavior.5  
Most prior research assumes that all justices have the same goals—as 
if every justice cared about the same things and placed the same weight 
on each of those priorities. A few scholars acknowledge that judges differ 
in the values they attach to different goals,6 but these scholars usually 
ignore varying goal preferences for fear “[t]he enterprise would 
devolve into ‘what-the-judge-ate-for-breakfast’ accounts, with goals ‘so 
numerous and relating to outcomes in so complex a manner as to obscure 
the actual basis for decision.’”7 “The importance of individual 
differences,” these scholars argue, “is dampened by . . . group constraints” 
and superseded by “institutional preferences.”8 Disregard for varying goal 
preferences is particularly pernicious in studies of the Supreme Court, 
which often assume that the justices’ institutional context renders non-
policy goals irrelevant. But, of course, the assumption that all Supreme 
Court justices pursue identical goals  is unrealistic. Just as all humans 
vary in their personal values and motivations,9 different justices likely 
prioritize different goals. Any comprehensive model of judicial behavior 
should account for these individual differences in order to understand the 
choices judges make. 
Accordingly, I adopt a “psychoeconomic” approach, which posits that 
Supreme Court justices have heterogeneous goal preferences; that is, 
justices vary in their propensity to seek different goals. Understanding 
 
5. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11 
(2013). 
6. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 188 
(1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994). 
7. Ronald A. Cass, Judging Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 
BOSTON U. L. REV. 941, 944 (1994).  
8. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 
172–73 (1998). 
9. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994).  
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the justices’ behavior requires an examination of the individual 
characteristics that make the them different from one other. I call this 
approach psychoeconomic because it incorporates the assumptions of 
both economic and psychological models. Humans are generally rational 
actors who make strategic choices in pursuit of their goals; however, 
humans also vary in their individual characteristics, and these varying 
characteristics prompt some individuals to prefer certain goals over 
others.10 Judges are no different—they generally pursue their goals, but 
they vary in their goal preferences. Therefore, in order to establish what 
they want, we must first determine who they are. This means 
understanding “their enduring emotional, interpersonal, experiential, 
attitudinal, and motivational styles”; in other words, we must understand 
their personalities.11  
THE BIG FIVE 
The study of personality as it relates to political phenomena has 
enjoyed a revival in recent years.12 Most of this research employs the 
five-factor model, also called the Big Five.13 The Big Five are based on 
extensive studies in which subjects rate how well adjectives or phrases 
describe themselves or others. Researchers then use factor analysis to 
identify the broad trait domains that underlie these responses.14 Most 
analyses identify five predominant traits: conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, neuroticism (or its inverse, emotional stability), and 
 
10. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
(1976). 
11. Robert R. McCrae & Oliver P. John, An Introduction to the Five-Factor Model and Its 
Applications, 60 J. PERSONALITY 175 (1992). 
12  See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacoby, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. 
L & SOC. SCI. 341 (2010). 
13. McCrae & John, supra note11, at 175. 
14.  John R. Alford et al., Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 153 (2005); Alan S. Gerber et al., Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships Across Issue 
Domains and Political Contexts, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (2010); Alan S. Gerber et al., The Big 
Five Personality Traits in the Political Arena, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 265 (2011) [hereinafter Big 
Five Personality Traits]; Jeffery J. Mondak et al., Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative 
Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (2010); 
JEFFREY J. MONDAK, PERSONALITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (2010) ; Jeffery 
J. Mondak & Karen D. Halperin, A Framework for the Study of Personality and Political Behaviour, 
38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 335 (2008). 
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openness or intellect. The five-factor model has been replicated in a 
variety of languages and contexts,15 and the literature suggests the Big 
Five are heritable16 and stable throughout life, especially after the age of 
fifty.17  
Social scientists have employed the Big Five to study the behavior of 
political elites, including state legislators and members of Congress,18 
and numerous historical and biographical accounts emphasize the 
importance of judges’ personalities.19 Therefore, the systematic study of 
judges’ personality traits may be particularly useful for explaining their 
behavior. More specifically, personality traits can help explain judges’ 
behavior by reflecting their goal preferences. The Big Five describe 
individuals’ global personalities; that is, “their enduring emotional, 
interpersonal, expe- riential, attitudinal, and motivational styles.”20 These 
“dispositional traits are believed to be stable aspects of individuals that 
shape how they respond to the vast array of stimuli they encounter in the 
world.”21 In other words, personality traits indicate an individual’s 
characteristic style of interacting with their environment—their 
perceptions, their attitudes, and their preferences with respect to particular 
goals.22 By describing the Big Five as goal preferences, I focus on their 
“motivational properties”—“Talkative people want to talk, sympathetic 
 
15.  Big Five Personality Traits, supra note 14, at 266. 
16.  Big Five Personality Traits, supra note 14, at 266. 
17. Avashalom Caspi et al., Personality Development: Stability and Change, 56 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOLOGY 453, 466–67 (2005). 
18.  See Bryce J. Dietrich et al., Personality and Legislative Politics: The Big Five Trait 
Dimensions Among U.S. State Legislators, 33 POL. PSYCHOL. 195 (2010); Adam J. Ramey et al., More 
than a Feeling: Personality and Congressional Behavior (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished paper) (SSRN 
No. 2405140). 
19.  E.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT 
DEFINED AMERICA (2007); HARRY N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA Of FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981). 
20. McCrae & John, supra note 11, at 175. 
21.  Big Five Personality Traits, supra note 14, at 266.  
22. Almlund et al. adopt a similar interpretation of personality traits: “Since personality 
psychologists define traits as ‘relatively’ stable, person-specific determinants of behavior, preferences 
are the natural counterpart of these traits in economics.” Mathilde Almlund et al., Personality 
Psychology and Economics 65 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Working Paper No. 5500, 2011). 
Consistent with this view, personality traits have been found to moderate how individuals weigh costs 
and benefits as they make political decisions. Alan S. Gerber et al., Big Five Personality Traits and 
Responses to Persuasive Appeals: Results from Voter Turnout Experiments, 35 POL. BEHAV. 687 
(2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/13
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people want to help; ergo, at least some traits have motivational 
properties.”23 Consequently, the Big Five can serve as valid proxies for an 
individual’s goal preferences. Personality traits reflect the relative weight 
that individuals place on different goals.24 Therefore, we can use a judge’s 
personality traits to predict their behavior in seeking out various judicial 
goals. In the following sections, I describe five primary judicial goals: 
duty, social interaction, social harmony, loss aversion, and intellectual 
stimulation. I then describe the Big Five factors that reflect the justices’ 
preferences for each of these goals: conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness, respectively. 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: A PREFERENCE FOR DUTY 
First, Supreme Court justices strive to fulfill their professional duties, 
which encompass two distinct sets of obligations: the duty to follow the 
law, and the duty to fulfill job-related tasks. 
Duty vs. Policy Preferences. Upon their confirmation to the bench, 
Supreme Court justices swear an oath to uphold the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States. Their professional duty obviously includes an 
obligation to fulfill that oath. Moreover, though technically not required, 
the vast majority of Supreme Court justices attended law school, practiced 
law, and served as a judge in a lower court before their appointment to the 
High Court. Consequently, most justices have been thoroughly socialized 
into the legal culture for decades.25 This culture strongly promotes the rule 
of law and the understanding that all lawyers and judges have an ethical 
obligation to follow legal norms.26 To be sure, lawyers and judges often 
 
23.  McCrae & John, supra note11 at 201. Other approaches to personality (as well as some 
popular conceptions of personality) depict traits as simple behavioral tendencies; however, the 
motivational approach is consistent with these alternative views. See ibid. It facilitates the 
incorporation of traits into economic choice models. See Almlund et al., supra note 22. 
24.  The integration of psychological theories into economic choice models is increasingly 
popular in political science, especially among proponents of behavioral economics. See, e.g., Rick K. 
Wilson, The Behavioral Economies to Political Science, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 201 (2011); Almlund 
et al., supra note 22, at 14. In contrast, I follow studies of personality psychology, biology, and 
neuroscience, which establish that stable and heritable personality traits influence individual behavior. 
See Almlund et al., supra note 22, at 14. 
25. James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of 
Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 21–25 (1983). 
26.  BAUM, supra note 4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disagree about what it means to follow legal norms. But few lawyers or 
judges would deny that they have a professional and ethical obligation to 
comply with standard legal norms and follow the law, as they best 
understand it.27  
However, the justices’ desire to fulfill their duty often lies in tension 
with another goal: their desire to influence policy. Justices generally 
prefer to support policies that are consistent with their own ideological 
preferences,28 but scholars have long recognized that the influence of 
judges’ preferences is “tempered by what they think they ought to do,” 
and judges vary in the extent to which they are willing to comply with 
legal norms.29 Thus, the degree to which justices try to align policy with 
their preferences should be moderated by their normative beliefs about 
how judges ought to make decisions. In other words, justices must 
balance their dutifulness against their policy goals. 
Duty vs. Effort Aversion. A justice’s duty also includes assisting in 
the Court’s practical, day-to-day functioning. At the simplest level, an 
appointment to the Supreme Court is a job, and like any other job, it 
comes with professional responsibilities. Supreme Court justices 
undoubtedly feel a sense of duty to fulfill these basic obligations by 
showing up for work, attending oral arguments and conferences, reading 
briefs and case materials, and writing their share of opinions; indeed, 
they were selected, in part, based on their track record of compentently 
preforming their judicial duties.30 Failure to meet these obligations may 
incur a variety of negative consequences. At the extreme, a justice who 
seriously neglects his or her responsibilities could theoretically face the 
threat of impeachment.31 More minor delinquency could damage a 
 
27. Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal 
Statutes?, 101 AM.  POL. SCI. REV. 321, 323 (2007); Barton L. Bartels, The Constraining Capacity of 
Legal Doctrine on the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 AM.  POL. SCI. REV. 474, 475 (2009); Michael A. Bailey 
& Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 370 (2008). 
28.  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2; C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 35 AM.  POL. SCI. REV. 890 (2008). 
29. James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of 
Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 9 (1983). 
30.  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 35. 
31. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 51 L. & SOC. REV. 83, 97 
(1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/13
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justice’s reputation or hinder the justice’s ability to pursue other goals. In 
contrast, reliably performing these tasks in an efficient and effective 
manner can yield valuable benefits, including influence, prestige, and 
respect both on and off the Court.32 Accordingly, justices generally strive 
to fulfill their basic judicial duties. 
However, judges undoubtedly gain satisfaction through nonjudicial 
activities, such as enjoying leisure, spending time with friends and family, 
and earning outside income.33 Judges may also gain satisfaction by 
engaging in other extra-judicial activities that further enhance their 
prestige or celebrity, such as writing, teaching, or lecturing.34 Therefore, 
judges generally seek to minimize the effort (both time and energy) they 
devote to judicial work in order to maximize these external 
satisfactions.35 But this desire to avoid job-related effort obviously lies in 
tension with their duty to fulfill their work obligations. Accordingly, 
justices must also balance their dutifulness against their effort aversion. 
Duty and Conscientiousness. Different justices balance these goals 
in different ways. The degree to which individuals prioritize duty is 
reflected by the Big Five factor of conscientiousness, which is defined as 
“[t]he degree to which a person is willing to comply with conventional 
rules, norms, and standards.”36 This broad trait incorporates several 
interrelated facets, which can be grouped into two “aspects.” The first 
aspect is called dutifulness or orderliness, and reflects whether an 
 
32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everyone Else Does–Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 
108–09 (2002); Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 6, at 165. 
33. Macey, supra note 9, at 630; Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV., 1, 2 (1993); Epstein & Knight, supra 
note 5, at 19. 
34. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. CHI. 
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205, 213 (2000); Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial 
Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON.  BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 36 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, 
Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000); 
BAUM, supra note 4, at 3. 
35. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 103. The authors assume that “the large size 
and quality of staff relative to the number of Justices and the Court’s light caseload in recent years 
imply that a Justice’s leisure activities and nonjudicial work activities are not significantly constrained 
by his or her judicial duties.” In contrast, I empirically test whether some justices minimize their job-
related effort. 
36. ROBERT HOGAN & JOYCE HOGAN, HOGAN PERSONALITY INVENTORY MANUAL 9 (3d ed. 
2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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individual is “governed by conscience.” The second aspect is called 
industriousness or achievement striving, and reflects whether an 
individual is diligent and thorough.37 In other words, highly 
conscientious individuals tend to be both responsible and hardworking, 
and these two characteristics are found together so frequently that they 
constitute aspects of the same broad trait. 
Therefore, a justice’s conscientiousness should reflect the degree to 
which that justice prioritizes duty versus their policy preferences and 
effort aversion. Highly conscientious justices prioritize duty; therefore, 
they should tend to follow legal norms (because they are governed by 
conscience) and expend more effort in their judicial work (because 
they are industrious and achievement striving). In contrast, less 
conscientious justices should tend to follow their ideological biases 
and avoid expending effort. For example, Justice Scalia has been 
described as a “conscientious” and “hard-working” justice,38 whose 
opinions are “carefully wrought” and “highly principled.”39 And, not 
surprisingly, Justice Scalia has written a separate opinion in more 
cases than any other justice on the Roberts Court (24.6% of cases 
during his career40), demonstrating his willingness to expend effort in 
the course of his judicial duties. 
EXTRAVERSION: A PREFERENCE FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION 
Next, Supreme Court justices value social interaction, either for the 
sake of social stimulation or as a means to influence others. 
Social Interaction vs. Isolation. Many scholars have recognized a 
judge’s “need to turn to others for social interaction.”41 In fact, 
 
37.  Colin G. DeYoung, Lena C. Quilty & Jordan B. Peterson, Between Facets and Domains: Ten 
Aspects of the Big Five, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 881 (2007); Henry Moon, The Two 
Faces of Conscientiousness: Duty and Achievement Striving in Escalation of Commitment Decisions, 
86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 533, 535 (2001); McCrae & John, supra note 11, at 197. 
38.  Jane Morice, Former Jones Day Colleague Remembers Scalia as Conscientious Lawyer 
with ‘Twinkle in his Eye,’ CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/ 
index.ssf/2016/02/former_jones_day_managing_part.html.  
39. RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 1 (2006). 
40.  All data reported in this manuscript were obtained from the Supreme Court Database. Harold 
J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Jeffrey Segal, Theodore J. Ruger & Sara C. Benesh, 2016 
Supreme Court Database, Version 2016 Release 01, http://supremecourtdatabase.org. 
41. Burton Atkins et al., Personality Theory and Judging: A Proposed Theory of Self Esteem and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/13
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socialization, including a sense of belonging, affiliation, and regular 
interaction, is one of the basic human needs.42 The desire for social 
interaction is particularly relevant for judges because their career requires 
an unusual level of isolation and limited interaction with others.43 Judges 
are expected to maintain a professional distance from lawyers and the 
parties in their courts in order to maintain objectivity. Often, the only 
peers with whom judges can freely and regularly interact are other 
judges. A job as a Supreme Court justice may be particularly isolating 
due to its elite status and the small number of justices of equal rank. 
Accordingly, many justices enjoy interacting with each other as part of 
their daily jobs. 
However, social interactions may also come with costs. Interactions 
take up time and energy, which means they can distract justices from 
their judicial work and leisure time. Interactions  may also cause stress or 
conflict. Some justices may actually prefer social isolation—in fact, the 
isolating nature of a judge’s job may have partially attracted them to a 
judicial career in the first place. Finally, the longer judges serve on the 
bench, the more they acclimate to social isolation,44 and Supreme Court 
justices have generally had long judicial careers. Accordingly, the 
justices must balance their desire for social interaction against the 
possible benefits of isolation. 
Social Interaction vs. Dominance Aversion. Supreme Court justices 
also value interaction with other justices because it enhances their own 
influence. Because the Court operates under majority rule, the justices’ 
capacity to influence legal and policy outcomes ultimately depends on 
their ability to build majority coalitions. Consequently, justices often 
strive to persuade, pressure,  or otherwise influence each others’ behavior 
through questioning at oral argument, the conference discussion, or 
bargaining memos.45 Repeated intra-Court interactions can also build 
 
Judicial Policy-Making, 2 L. & POL’Y Q. 181, 196 (1980); JOEL B. GROSSMAN & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, 
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (1969). 
42. A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 381-82 (1943); 
DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION (1987). 
43. Lenore Alpert et al., Becoming a Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter, 62 
JUDICATURE 325, 331 (1979). 
44.  Id. 
45. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 349, 350 (2005); James F. Spriggs II et al., Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mature and balanced relationships, which facilitates consensus and 
coalition building.46 Interactions also help justices acquire information 
about their colleagues’ preferences, intentions, and plans,47 and this 
information may aid the justices’ ability to act strategically in order to 
advance their legal and policy goals.48 Therefore, justices may also value 
social interaction as a means to influence one another. But, of course, 
influencing other justices through social interactions consumes valuable 
time and energy, and justices may prefer to conserve that effort for other 
tasks.49 Intra-Court bargaining and debate may also hinder collegial 
relations if other justices feel unduly pressured; for example, when judges 
pressure each other (especially along ideological lines) it often leads to 
distrustfulness, stubbornness, and suboptimal outcomes.50 Finally, 
striving to influence other justices may cause personal stress and 
frustration that could otherwise be avoided, and some justices may feel 
uncomfortable with assertive and dominant behavior. Accordingly, 
justices must balance the benefits of influencing other justices against the 
desire for dominance aversion. 
Social Interaction and Extraversion. The degree to which 
individuals prioritize social interaction is reflected by the Big Five factor 
of extraversion, which is defined as “[t]he degree to which a person 
needs attention and social interaction.”51 This trait also incorporates two 
“aspects.” The first is called sociability or enthusiasm, which reflects a 
person’s desire for affiliation and interaction with others; the second is 
called dominance or assertiveness, which indicates the degree  to which 
an individual strives to influence others.52 Highly extraverted justices 
prefer to prioritize social interaction; therefore, they should tend to 
engage with others (because they are sociable and gregarious) and 
dominate others (because they are active and assertive). Less extraverted 
justices should tend to isolate themselves and avoid dominant behavior. 
 
Justices’ Responses to Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 487 (1999). 
46. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1639, 1639 (2003). 
47.  Edwards, supra note 46, at 1661–62. 
48.  LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12–13 (1998). 
49.  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 31. 
50.  Edwards, supra note 46, at 1648–49. 
51.  Hogan and Hogan, supra note 36, at 95. 
52.  DeYoung et al., supra note 37, at 883; McCrae & John, supra note 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/13
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For example, Justice Kagan has been called “a classic extrovert”53 and, 
consistent with that appraisal, has received a higher per- centage of 
majority opinions assignments from the chief justice during her career 
than any other justice on the Roberts Court (14.2% of all cases). 
AGREEABLENESS: A PREFERENCE FOR SOCIAL HARMONY 
Supreme Court justices also value social harmony with others. Human 
beings generally desire affection, warmth, and caring.54 For justices, this 
desire manifests itself in two ways. 
Social Harmony vs. Individuality. First, justices value harmonious 
relations with their colleagues on the bench. Regardless of how frequently 
the justices interact with their colleagues, they generally prefer that those 
interactions are warm and pleasant. Indeed, judges’ job satisfaction 
depends in large part on their ability to get along with their colleagues.55 
Accordingly, it is no surprise that judges value social harmony among 
their fellow justices and strive to maintain collegial relations with their 
peers on the bench.56  
However, promoting social harmony on the Court often comes at 
considerable cost. Usually, the best way to get along with other justices is 
to prioritize the majority’s preferences and forgo one’s own personal 
goals and strategic opportunities.57 In many situations, justices may 
prefer to incur collegiality costs rather than sacrifice their other goals.58 
Moreover, risk-acceptant judges who thrive in competitive environments 
may actually seek out conflict as a bargaining strategy.59 Therefore, 
 
53. Dahlia Lithwick, Her Honor, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/news/ 
politics/elena-kagan-2011-12/. 
54.  Maslow, supra note 42, at 380–81. 
55.  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 31. 
56.  Edwards, supra note 46; Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One 
Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 908 
(1987). 
57.  Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the Court of Appeals, 75 JUDICATURE 26, 26–27 (1991); 
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001). 
58. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011). 
59.  Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 
52 J. POLITICS 54, 60 (1990). 
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justices must weigh the benefits of social harmony against their sense of 
individuality. 
Social Harmony vs. Objectivity. Justices may also value social 
harmony in the broader sense of promoting “norms of Right or Justice.”60 
Some justices may pursue these goals in an attempt to enhance their 
reputation among “elite reporters and elite law professors”61 or even secure 
a place in history.62 Others may be motivated by more selfless goals, such 
as promoting moral principles63 or rights protection.64 Either way, justices 
may sometimes make decisions in an effort to help people beyond their 
immediate social world, particularly disadvantaged members of society. 
But even helping the disadvantaged comes at a price. Supreme Court 
justices are supposed to make decisions based on neutral principles of 
law, rather than their personal sympathies or their desire for popularity.65 
Actively promoting preferred policy outcomes (for example, those that 
promte social harmony) may incur reputational costs for judges.66 
Pursuing this goal might also underminine collegiality on the Court if 
social harmony takes on an ideological meaning (for example, liberal 
social values).67 Promoting social welfare could even endanger a justice’s 
career; for example, years after the Brown decision, Southern highways 
were littered with signs that read “Impeach Earl Warren,” and dozens of 
congressmen signed the Southern Manifesto, which condemned Warren’s 
ruling in Brown.68 Accordingly, justices must weigh their desire to 
promote social welfare against their professional obligation to maintain 
objectivity.  
Social Harmony and Agreeableness.  The degree to which 
individuals prioritize social harmony against their desire for individuality 
 
60. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957). 
61.  Schauer, supra note 34, at 630. 
62.  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 266. 
63.  RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985). 
64.  Schauer, supra note 34, at 627. 
65.  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
15–17 (1959). 
66.  Miceli & Cosgel, supra note 34, at 49. 
67.  Edwards, supra note 46, at 1646. 
68.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 320 (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 141 (2000). 
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and objectivity is reflected by the Big Five factor of agreeableness, which 
is defined as “[t]he degree to which a person needs pleasant and 
harmonious relations with others.”69 This trait can also be divided into 
two general “aspects”: politeness, meaning the degree to which a person is 
cooperative and tolerant, and compassion, which reflects “the more 
humane aspects of humanity—characteristics such as altruism, 
nurturance, caring, and emotional support.”70 Highly agreeable justices 
prefer to prioritize social harmony; therefore, they should tend to 
cooperate with others because they value harmonious relations. They also 
show compassion toward those in need because they are caring and 
nurturing. In contrast, less agreeable justices should be less likely to be 
cooperative or compassionate. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy 
both exemplify agreeableness. Roberts has been described as a “good-
natured” justice with a reputation for “good humor” who “managed to 
excel without making enemies.”71 Similarly, Kennedy is an “energetic, 
self-effacing and immensely polite man.”72 Moreover, both of these 
agreeable justices have the lowest career dissent rates on the Court (12% 
and 9%, respectively). 
NEUROTICISM: A PREFERENCE FOR LOSS AVERSION 
Supreme Court justices, like all humans, tend to be loss averse. That is, 
for most people, “losses and disadvantages have greater impact on 
preferences than gains and advantages.”73 Loss aversion causes justices to 
focus on negativity and avoid risks. 
Loss Aversion vs. Rationality. First, loss aversion causes justices to 
focus on the negative aspects of experiences rather than the positive 
aspects, even in riskless choices. This focus on negativity causes 
individuals to fear loss more than an equal gain, prefer the current state 
 
69.  Hogan & Hogan, supra note 36, at 9. 
70.  McCrae & John, supra note 11 at 196; DeYoung et al., supra note 37, at 885. 
71. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 262–63, 
335 (2007). 
72.  Robert Reinhold, Man in the News; Restrained Pragmatist Anthony M. Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/12/us/man-in-the-news-restrained-pragmatist-
anthony-m-kennedy.html?pagewanted=all. 
73. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 
(1991). 
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of affairs to any change (status quo bias), and value objects they currently 
possess more than identical objects they do not possess (the endowment 
effect).74 Of course, federal judges with life tenure and high fixed 
salaries are well insulated from many common losses, such as losing 
their job or receiving a pay cut. But they may, nonetheless, face other 
types of potential loss. As Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit 
explains, “[l]ifetime tenure insulates judges from anxiety over worldly 
cares for body and home and family. But it does not protect them from 
the unconscious urge for the approbation of their fellow men.”75 In other 
words, because judges are insulated from many common forms of loss, 
they tend to focus on reputational and interpersonal forms of loss, such as 
the embarrassment, stress, and anxiety associated with criticism from 
their peers, academics, or the public.76 Accordingly, justices generally 
strive to avoid these reputational and interpersonal losses. But loss 
aversion is an inherently irrational psychological phenomenon. Many 
decisions involve both gains and losses, and focusing primarily on losses 
often leads individuals to make irrational choices. Among Supreme Court 
justices, focusing on reputational losses may lead justices to undervalue 
the benefits of prominence. For example, authoring the opinion of the 
Court may involve considerable stress and criticism as other justices 
employ a “mixture of appeals, threats, and offers to compromise” in an 
attempt to influence the opinion.77 Therefore, a loss averse justice may 
prefer to avoid majority opinion assignments. But these assignments also 
offer increased policy influence and prestige, and these benefits may 
outweigh the costs associated with the stress of leadership. Therefore, 
Supreme Court justices must weigh the costs of reputational and 
interpersonal losses against the benefits of attention-attracting activities. 
Loss Aversion vs. Risk Taking. Second, loss aversion leads to a 
related human tendency called risk aversion.78 When individuals decide 
whether to take a risk, they typically do so by weighing the potential 
 
74. Id. at 1042–43. JAMES MONTIER, BEHAVIOURAL INVESTING: A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO 
APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE (2007). 
75.  John R. Brown, Hail to the Chief: Hutcheson, the Judge, 38 TEX. L. REV. 140, 145 (1959). 
76.  Schauer, supra note 34, at 630; Miceli & Cosgel, supra note 34, at 49 
77.  WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 42 (1964). 
78.  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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costs and benefits.79  However, loss averse individuals tend to place 
greater weight on potential losses than on potential gains; in fact, one 
study studies suggests that loss aversion causes humans to weigh losses 
roughly twice as heavily as they do gains.80 Therefore, even if a risk 
involves a greater potential gain than loss, a loss averse individual might 
place greater emphasis on the possible loss and, consequently, prefer to 
avoid the risk. In short, the general tendency toward loss aversion causes 
a general tendency towards risk aversion. Accordingly, justices generally 
strive to avoid situations that involve risk, especially risk to their 
reputations. 
But, of course, risk taking is essential for justices to take advantage of 
potential opportunities, and many justices are happy to accept potential 
risks. In fact, justices often seek out activities that involve the risk of 
criticism or embarrassment in order to to gain prominence, prestige, and 
celebrity.81 For example, some justices seek out opportunities to speak in 
public, lecture in universities, publish academic articles, and author 
popular books.82 Accordingly, justices must balance the potential benefits 
associated with risky behavior (such as seeking prominence) against the 
possible costs of these activities (such as negative attention). 
Loss Aversion and Neuroticism. The degree to which individuals 
prioritize loss aversion relative to gains and potential gains is reflected by 
the Big Five factor of neuroticism, which is defined as “[t]he degree to 
which a person experiences the world as threatening and beyond his/her 
control.”83 In other words, neuroticism reflects an individual’s “tendency 
to experience distress . . . [and] chronic negative effects.”84 This trait can 
also be divided into two general “aspects.” The first aspect is called 
volatility, which reflects a person’s tendency to feel emotions that cause 
them to lose their composure and lash out, such as anger, irritability, and 
 
79.  See Milton Friedman & Leonard J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risks, 56 
J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). 
80. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 310 (1992) (“for even chances to win 
and lose, a prospect will only be accepted if the gain is at least twice as large as the loss”). 
81. Miceli & Cosgel, supra note 34, at 36; Schauer, supra note 34, at 630; BAUM, supra note 4, at 
39–40. 
82.  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 37–38. 
83.  Hogan & Hogan, supra note 36 at 9. 
84.  McCrae & John, supra note 11, at 195. 
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mood instability. The second aspect is called withdrawal. Withdrawal 
reflects an individual’s tendency to feel emotions that cause them to 
withdraw from activities, interactions, and risks, such as sadness, fear, 
doubt, and embarrassment.85 Highly neurotic justices tend to prioritize 
loss aversion; therefore, they should tend to focus on costs and losses 
(because they are irritable and easily upset) and withdraw from 
interactions and risks (because they are anxious, fearful, and easily 
embarrassed). In contrast, less neurotic justices should focus on gains and 
seek out risky, but potentially beneficial, situations. For instance, Justice 
Sotomayor has been described as “withdrawn,” “listless,” and “plagued 
by her own self doubts” during her early life.86 And, as one might expect, 
she has received a lower percentage of majority opinions assignments 
from the chief justice during her career when their is a minimum winning 
coalition than any other justice on the Roberts Court (10% of cases with a 
minimum majority coalition). 
OPENNESS: A PREFERENCE FOR INTELLECTUAL STIMULATION 
Finally, judges value intellectual stimulation from their jobs. By 
definition, most people prefer more interesting work over mundane tasks. 
Moreover, some judges enjoy the intrinsic pleasures associated with 
resolving legal disputes, such as writing opinions.87 Therefore, Supreme 
Court justices may gain job satisfaction from intellectual variety and 
intellectual challenges in their jobs. 
Intellectual Stimulation vs. Consistency. First, many judges value 
variety in their judicial work. Lower court judges are often required to 
hear numerous disputes on similar issues, which creates monotony and 
 
85.  DeYoung et al., supra note 37, at 887, 894, and 896. 
86.  MEG GREENE, SONIA SOTOMAYOR: A BIOGRAPHY 21–37 (2012). 
87. See Posner, supra note 33. Judge Posner acknowledges “the intrinsic pleasure of writing, for 
those who like to write, and of exercising and displaying analytical prowess or other intellectual gifts, for 
those who have them and want to use them” Id. at 14. Nonetheless, he “ignore[s] these and other 
additional sources of satisfaction in the work of a judge” under the premise that “they are not important 
to most judges, who are happy to cede opinion-writing to eager law clerks, believing . . . that the core 
judicial function is deciding, that is, voting, rather than articulating the grounds of decision.” Id. at 19. 
However, he offers no evidence or citation to support that claim. In contrast, I argue that many judges 
may appreciate intellectual stimulation. 
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boredom.88  In contrast, because the Supreme Court controls its own 
docket, the justices can strongly influence the variety of legal issues they 
hear, and they generally avoid mundane and routine disputes.89 Those 
who generally value change and new experiences also tend to hold  
unconventional ideas and oppose conservative values.90 Consequently, 
highly open individuals tend to promote liberal values.91  
But pursuing variety and change also incurs significant costs. Hearing 
a wide variety of cases requires the justices to invest more time and 
energy into researching different statutes, precedents, and legal rules.92 
Therefore, judges may craft procedural rules in order to help avoid 
hearing cases about which they have little interest or expertise.93 
Additionally, trying to use the law as a tool to promote liberal values may 
conflict with a judge’s professional obligations.94 Accordingly, justices 
must weigh their interest in variety and change against regularity and 
consistency. 
Intellectual Stimulation vs. Simplicity. Second, judges undoubtedly 
find some cases more interesting then others and prefer to think, talk, and 
write about the cases they find especially intriguing.95 Cases that reach 
the Supreme Court often involve interesting and controversial legal 
issues; in fact, the Court’s rules specifically state that the justices should 
consider whether a case poses an “important question of federal law.”96 
Thus, after gaining control over their own docket, the justices tended to 
hear more important and contentious legal controversies.97  
Yet, even among those cases that reach the High Court, some cases are 
more interesting than others. Some Supreme Court cases attract numerous 
amicus curie briefs, inspire frequent questioning by the justices during 
 
88.  John T. Wold, Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court 
Decisionmaking, 62 JUDICATURE 58, 64–65 (1978). 
89.  Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 57, at 364. 
90.  McCrae & John, supra note 11, at 198; Almlund et al., supra note 22, at 72. 
91.  Big Five Personality Traits, supra note 14, at 269. 
92.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 32, at 113–14. 
93.  Macey, supra note 9, at 632; Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 8, at 158. 
94.  Wechsler, supra note 65, at 15–16. 
95.  See, e.g.,Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 8, at 189. 
96.  Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
97.  Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 57, at 364. 
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oral argument, and are covered on the front page of major newspapers.98  
In contrast, other cases are of considerably less concern to interest 
groups, the justices, and the media. In fact, a small portion of the 
Court’s docket consists of mandatory cases that the justices hear only 
because they are required to do so. Moreover, justices often develop 
particular interest and expertise in certain areas of law.99 For example, 
“[s]ome [judges] enjoy complex tax and bankruptcy cases, while others 
abhor them.”100 Accordingly, cases that are interesting to one justice may 
not be interesting other justices. Supreme Court justices are especially 
likely to gain intellectual satisfaction from hearing cases related to those 
legal issues that interest them most. 
However, resolving important and interesting cases also comes at 
considerable cost. Difficult intellectual challenges may take more time 
and energy to resolve, and the challenge may cause stress and 
anxiety.101 Highly salient cases might also attract more attention from 
peers, academics, and the public and, therefore, pose the threat of 
negative attention.102 Finally, the old legal adage, “hard cases make bad 
law,”103 suggests that tackling the most difficult intellectual challenges 
may create undesirable precedents. Accordingly, simpler cases may offer 
better opportunities to develop clear and well-reasoned legal rules. 
Therefore, justices must weigh the desirability of tackling interesting 
intellectual challenges against the benefits of hearing simple and 
straightforward cases.  
Intellectual Stimulation and Openness. The degree to which 
individuals prioritize intellec- tual stimulation is reflected by the Big 
Five factor of openness/intellect, which defined as is “[t]he degree to 
 
98. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 74 
(2000); Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and Concurrances on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
27 American Politics Research 488, 500 (1999); Ryan C. Black et al., Toward an Actor-Based Measure 
of Supreme Court Case Salience: Information Seeking and Engagement During Oral Arguments, 66 POL. 
RES. Q. 804, 805 (2013). 
99.  Black et al., supra note 98, at 804. 
100. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 8, at 188. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, 
Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007). 
101.  Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 8, at 177. 
102.  Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 32. 
103.  Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904). 
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which a person needs intellectual stimulation, change, and variety.”104 As 
its name implies, this trait can also be divided into two general “aspects.” 
The openness aspect reflects the degree to which a person enjoys variety, 
change, and new experiences, while the intellect aspect reflects an 
individual’s interest in philosophical discussions, abstract ideas, and 
complex problems.105 Highly open justices prefer to prioritize intellectual 
stimulation; therefore, they should tend to seek out new experiences and 
promote progressive ideas (because they value variety and change) and 
seek out intellectual challenges (because they enjoy abstract, 
philosophical discussions). In contrast, less open justices should be less 
likely to seek out variety, change, or intellectual complexity. For 
example, one of the most important changes Supreme Court justices can 
make is to formally alter one of the Court’s precedents. Justice Kagan, an 
“open-minded” and “progressive” academic who loves literature and the 
opera,106 is the only justice who has never dissented from a majority 
opinion that formally altered a precedent. 
A PSYCHOECONOMIC MODEL OF SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR 
In sum, Supreme Court justices maximize their job satisfaction by 
pursuing multiple goals, including duty, social interaction, social 
harmony, loss aversion, and intellectual stimulation. However, the value 
of these goals varies depending on the justices’ personality traits. Each of 
the Big Five factors reflects the justices’ preferences with respect to a 
specific judicial goal. Table 1 presents the Big Five factors, their 
definitions, and associated characteristics. The last column lists the 
specific preferences that are reflected by each factor. 
Combining these theoretical expectations, a justice’s utility function 
with respect to job satis- faction (S) can be formalized as follows: 
S = f (DUT (c), SOC(e), HAR(a), LOS(n), INT (o)) (1) 
 
104.  Hogan & Hogan, supra note 36, at 9. 
105.  DeYoung et al., supra note 37, at 888; McCrae & John, supra note 11, at 197. 
106. Sherl Gay Stolberg, Katharine Q. Seelye & Lisa W. Foderaromay, A Climb Marked by 
Confidence and Canniness, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/ 
politics/10kagan.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
FRIEDMAN/DAY ARTICLE  3/20/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:101 
 
 
DUT denotes the satisfaction a justice receives from dutifulness, 
which is a function of conscien- tiousness (c). SOC denotes satisfaction 
from social interactions, which depends on extraversion (e).  
Table 1: The Big Five 
Trait Definition Associated 
Characteristics 
Goal Preference 
Extraversion The degree to which 
a person needs 
attention and social 
interaction. 
Talkative, assertive, 
active, sociable, 
gregarious vs. quiet, 
reserved, shy 
Social interaction 
Agreeableness The degree to which 
a person needs 
pleasant and 
harmonious 
relations with 
others. 
Sympathetic, kind, 
friendly, 
cooperative, tolerant 
vs. fault-finding, 
cold, unfriendly 
Social harmony 
Conscientiousness The degree to which 
a person is willing 
to comply with 
conventional rules, 
norms, and 
standards. 
Organized, 
hardworking, 
achievement-
striving, responsible 
vs. careless, 
disorderly, frivolous 
Duty 
Neuroticism The degree to which 
a person 
experiences the 
world as threatening 
and beyond control. 
Tense, anxious, 
emotional, nervous, 
embarrassed vs. 
stable, calm, 
contented 
Loss aversion 
Openness/intellect The degree to which 
a person needs 
intellectual 
stimulation, change, 
and variety. 
Imaginative, 
widely-interested, 
intelligent vs. 
commonplace 
simple, narrowly-
interested 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Note. Table reports definitions and associated characteristics for the Big Five factors. The 
last column reports the goal preference reflected by each factor. 
HAR indicates satisfaction from social harmony, which is a function of 
agreeableness (a). LOS indicates satisfaction from loss aversion, which 
depends on neuroticism (n). Finally, INT denotes satisfaction from 
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intellectual stimulation, which depends on openness (o). 
Because Supreme Court justices make decisions in pursuit of multiple 
goals and their individual personality traits determine the relative 
importance of those goals, a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court 
behavior must account for the judges’ personality traits. Future research on 
judicial behavior should develop valid and reliable measures of the 
justices’ personality traits and specific expectations regarding how those 
traits may influence specific behaviors on the Court. Only by considering 
the full range of individual differences across individual justices will we 
start to understand the complex nature of Supreme Court decision making. 
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